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Abstract
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Germany, equalization transfers from higher-level budgets (“Zuweisungen”) play an important role as 
a source of revenue for municipal budgets. They are designed to cover the gap between the financial needs 
of the municipalities and their own tax revenues. The goals are, on the one hand, to help the municipalities 
provide an adequate level of public goods and on the other, to smooth regional disparities (Rosenfeld, 
2010). The main type of transfer from higher-level budgets is the so-called non-matching or general-
purpose transfer. These transfers have a lump-sum character and are allocated on the basis of a formula 
that compares fiscal need and fiscal capacity. 
This type of financial support for municipalities exists in many countries. The economic effects of such 
transfers have been extensively studied both theoretically and empirically. According to median voter 
theory, the effect on local government expenditures from changes in lump-sum intergovernmental 
transfers and from changes in private incomes should be equal (Bradford and Oates, 1971a/ b). That means 
that depending on the income elasticity of the median voter, local governments should forward transfers 
to local taxpayers by lowering tax rates and increasing expenditure on the enhancement of public services 
and goods. In empirical terms, however, many authors find that compared to a rise in revenue from other 
sources there is a stronger increase in public spending in response to a rise in lump-sum intergovernmental 
transfers. This is the so-called “flypaper effect” (Oates, 1988, p. 77).1 The theoretical implication is that 
political agents conceal the lump-sum character of transfers and use the money to extend their budgets 
instead of refunding it to taxpayers (Dollery and Worthington, 1996).  
Many studies, e.g. Dollery and Worthington (1995); Knight (2002); Logan (1986); Grossman (1990) 
support the existence of the flypaper effect. However, several authors (e.g. Hines and Thaler, 1995; 
Hamilton, 1983) doubt its existence and criticize misguided empirical procedures (matching and non-
matching transfers mixed up together) or errors in statistical modeling (endogeneity not considered). 
According to Becker (1991), the flypaper effect is sensitive to the specification of the expenditure 
equations and the modeling of transfers to municipalities. She argues that potential endogeneity of 
                                                     
1 The flypaper effect was initially examined in studies by Oates (1979), Gramlich et al. (1973), and Courant et al. 
(1979). 
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transfers could inflate the estimate of the spending response and suggests correcting for this. Other 
authors, such as Knight (2002) for US highway aid transfers and Gordon (2004) for US school district aid 
transfers, find that the flypaper effect disappears altogether after accounting for endogeneity with 
instrumental variables. On the other hand, in their quasi-experimental studies examining the effect of non-
matching transfers on local fiscal policy, Baskaran (2016) for Germany, Allers and Vermeulen (2016) for 
the Netherlands, and Dahlberg et al. (2008) for Sweden find evidence for the existence of a flypaper effect 
(after accounting for endogeneity). The contradictory nature of these findings provides us with the 
motivation for a careful empirical investigation based on detailed German data. 
We examine the effect of transfers on eight municipal expenditure subcategories and the total 
expenditures, as well as on property tax, and business tax multipliers. The analysis is performed for two 
German federal states: Saxony (east) and North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW, west). The questions we ask 
are: Can a flypaper effect be identified for total expenditures of the municipalities and eight expenditure 
subcategories? If so, which expenditure subcategories are influenced to a higher degree? Are there 
differences between the estimates from two federal states characterized by different municipal revenue 
structures? In the flypaper literature on Germany,2 analysis by expenditure category at a sufficiently 
detailed level and the attempt at an east-west comparison are both novel. Our study is most closely related 
to the study by Baskaran (2016) on Hesse. However, municipal transfers in Hesse are subject to special 
rules that do not exist in other German federal states. In addition, we do not limit the estimations to a 
particular type of municipalities. Accordingly, we believe that our findings are more readily transferable 
to other federal states and can claim greater overall validity.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 addresses the German fiscal equalization scheme and the 
particularities of NRW and Saxony. The data is described in Section 3. Section 4 specifies the empirical 
model. After that, Section 5 presents our results for the two federal states and discusses subsequent 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                     
2 Moisio (2002) has also analyzed the flypaper effect at a municipal level in Finland. 
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2. FISCAL EQUALIZATION SCHEMES AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND IN NRW AND SAXONY 
Germany’s basic constitutional law gives each municipality the right to handle local matters as it sees fit 
(Article 28 (2) constitutional law). This so-called “autonomy of usage” is designed to encourage flexibility 
and ensure efficient expenditure planning. On the other hand, federal states and municipalities do not have 
comprehensive autonomy of revenue collection since tax revenue potential varies widely across the 
country and autonomous collection would contradict the basic principle of “equal living conditions” 
(Article 72 (2) and Article 106 (3) constitutional law). Accordingly, the federation imposes income tax, 
value-added tax, and most excise taxes and tolls; the federal states impose vehicle and wealth taxes; and 
the municipalities mainly impose business and property taxes (Rudzio, 2003). Business tax is a tax on the 
profits made by commercial enterprises. Property tax is levied on the possession of land and property. 
Other minor municipal taxes include tourist charges, entertainment tax, dog tax etc. The municipalities 
decide on the level of the tax multipliers that have a direct impact on the amount of their business and 
property tax revenues. The multiplier is determined annually in the municipal budget statutes and 
represents a given percentage by which the basic federal rate is multiplied. The lowest rate for business-
tax multipliers per municipality is determined by the federation at a 200 % threshold. A summary of the 
statistics on the levels of these tax multipliers is provided in Table 7 in the Appendix. In comparison with 
other German states, both Saxony and NRW have high tax-multipliers (Goerl et al., 2013, p. 125). 
In addition to the taxes that municipalities raise themselves, they receive a share of the income tax and 
value-added tax revenue collected higher up (as mentioned before). On top of that, most municipalities 
receive transfers representing a significant source of revenue for them. These transfers are of two major 
kinds: (a) non-matching transfers (“allgemeine Zuweisungen”), where the recipient municipality has full 
power of disposal, and (b) matching transfers (“zweckgebundene Zuweisungen”), where the transfer 
authority has an influence on the use of the funds in question. Non-matching transfers divide into transfers 
estimated according to the formalized tax system (formula-based transfers, “Schlüsselzuweisungen”) and 
transfers estimated per capita or in accordance with other disposal criteria (need-based transfers, 
“Bedarfszuweisungen”). Matching transfers are divided in investment transfers and transfers for present 
purposes (Tanzmann, 2012). 
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Due to differences in fiscal capacity (“Steuerkraft”) and fiscal need (“Finanzbedarf”), municipal tasks 
cannot be assured equally throughout all municipalities on the sole basis of their own revenues. The 
purpose common to all formula-based equalization schemes is to offset the gap between fiscal need and 
fiscal capacity. In all German federal states they function in much the same way. In general, a preliminary 
fixed total amount is made available for distribution to municipalities and to cities with county status. It 
is adjusted every year depending on the revenues of the federal state. In both our federal states around 85 
% of all funds are allocated via formula-based transfers. 80% of these transfers are allocated to 
municipalities and cities with county status, the rest goes to higher-order authorities (Goerl et al., 2013).  
One important aspect of the institutional background is the way different-sized municipalities are treated. 
To calculate the fiscal need of a municipality its population is multiplied by a weighting factor that 
depends on the population bracket a municipality belongs to.3 This is designed to account for the 
increasing fiscal expenditure for every additional citizen and the increasing costs for the provision of 
public goods and services (so-called “Einwohnerveredelung”). In NRW and Saxony, intermediate 
weighting factors are calculated for municipalities with population sizes between the staggered levels. In 
other words, an increase in the population size of the municipality within a given bracket leads to an 
equivalent increase in the weighting factor. This is a difference from the practice of stepwise weighting 
in Hesse described in Baskaran (2016).  In addition, both states (NRW and Saxony) consider the number 
of students attending school when they calculate the amount of transfers. Population size and school 
students are then multiplied by a basic amount (“Grundbetrag”) to determine the fiscal need.4  
There are a few minor differences between the transfer schemes in Saxony and NRW. They do not 
however seriously affect our analysis. One initial difference is the additional matching formula-based 
transfers for investment purposes paid to Saxon municipalities only. Their purpose is to bridge the 
infrastructural gap in eastern Germany.5 These transfers constitute 8% of the total formula-based transfers 
                                                     
3 In Saxony there are 6 such brackets: up to 1,500 inhabitants; 4,000; 7,500; 15,000; 35,000; above 100,000. 
4 Both fiscal equalization laws are available from: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Municipal Issues North Rhine-
Westphalia (2013); Saxon State Ministry of Finance (2013). 
5 An overview of the equalization scheme and the total transfer scheme in Saxony is available from Saxon State 
Ministry of Finance, http://www.finanzen.sachsen.de/1216.html. 
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in Saxony and are in fact “matching” (i.e. linked to a specific spending purpose). This is why in the 
German regional statistics (Genesis database) they are added to other matching transfers.  
The compensation rate is a second difference between Saxony and NRW. In Saxony it amounts to 75 %, 
in NRW to 90 %. This means that if fiscal need is higher than fiscal capacity 75 % or 90 % of the 
difference, respectively, is made up for. If the fiscal need of a municipality is lower than its fiscal capacity 
it is classified as “abundant.” This applies to only a few municipalities in our sample, particularly in 
NRW.6  
3. DATA ON MUNICIPAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
The investigation is performed using a dataset on all municipalities in the German federal states of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Saxony. In our sample, NRW consists of 396 and Saxony of 430 
municipalities for the investigation period 2009-2013. Accordingly, the final sample contains 1980 
observations in NRW and 2150 observations in Saxony. The data collected cover municipal expenditures, 
revenues (taxes and transfers), population and other indicators of relevance. The data were obtained from 
the statistical databases “Genesis online” of the two states. The selection of the sample is motivated by 
the availability of detailed data on the structure of municipal revenue sources and municipal expenditures. 
We also focus on NRW and Saxony for reasons of size (NRW is the most highly populated state in all 
Germany and Saxony the most highly populated state in eastern Germany, see Table 1), comparability of 
expenditure subcategories, and because the relevant part of the transfer allocation schemes in both states 
are representative in the German context. 
We normalized all monetary values using the consumer price index of the year 2010. 
                                                     
6 In a separate estimation in the section on robustness we restrict the sample to non-abundant municipalities.  
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TABLE 1 
FACTS ON NRW AND SAXONY (2009-2013) 
Indicator NRW Saxony 
GDP in € per capita 30,795 (2009); 34,777 (2013) 21,877 (2009); 25,825 (2013) 
Unemployment rates in % 8.9 (2009), 8.3 (2013) 12.9 (2009), 9.4 (2013) 
Population 17,872,763 (2009), 17,571,856 
(2013) 
 
4,168,732 (2009), 4,046,385 
(2013) 
Beneficiary status in the 
German fiscal equalization 
scheme in the period 2009-2013 
2010-2013 2009-2013 
Source: Genesis online 
Table 1 shows how selected facts compare in the two states. The GDP per capita of NRW is just above 
the German average of 34,219 € per capita in 2013. GDP per capita in Saxony is considerably lower. Both 
were beneficiary states within the German fiscal equalization scheme for most of the investigation period. 
One of the most important sources of regional economic inequality in Germany is still the former division 
of the country. Recent research (Vollmer et al., 2013; Colavecchio et al., 2011) suggests that the spatial 
disparities in income and economic activity between former “eastern” and “western” German federal 
states remain large. Furthermore, there is a clear difference between the two parts in terms of the structure 
of the municipal revenue sources. Generally speaking, eastern municipalities are much more dependent 
on equalization transfers and grants, and they collect less tax revenue per capita than western 
municipalities.  
Kernel density estimators for total tax revenues per capita and total transfer revenues per capita in the 
municipalities of Saxony and NRW are shown in the Appendix Figure 3. They reflect the typical east-
west divide in municipal revenue structure. Further details on the composition of revenue can be found in 
Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
STATE SIZE OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE CATEGORIES IN NRW AND SAXONY (2009-2013) 
Revenue category NRW Saxony 
Business tax 19-21 % 12-16 % 
Property tax 6 % 5 % 
Income tax 12-13 % 7-10 % 
Other general municipal taxes 1-2 % 1-2 % 
Formula-based transfers 12 % 19-22 % 
Investment transfers 3-5 % 8-12 % 
Transfers and grants for present 
purposes 
4-5 % 7-9 % 
Other general transfers 2-3 % 1 % 
Other revenue sources 33-41 % 23-40 % 
Source: own calculations based on Genesis online 
In NRW, two major revenue sources are the share on municipal business- and income tax. In Saxony, by 
contrast, formula-based transfers are the major revenue category, followed by business tax and investment 
transfers. Despite the lower compensation rate (75% vs. 90%), transfers represent a larger share of revenue 
in Saxony. This pattern repeats itself when we look at per capita revenues (Table 7 in the Appendix). 
Other revenue sources are shares of value-added tax, fees, levies, loans, and other transfers. Formula-
based transfers per capita are almost 30 % higher in Saxony. These differences may have an impact on 
the existence and the magnitude of a possible flypaper effect. 
It transpires, however, that as far as the structure of their expenditures is concerned, only slight differences 
exist between the municipalities in NRW and Saxony. The public spending shares in Table 3 indicate that 
administration expenditure represents the major subcategory in both federal states, followed by the social 
services and infrastructure (TIC) subcategory. As we can see from this table, the expenditure 
subcategories in NRW and Saxony are similar in size. A detailed description of the expenditure 
subcategories can be found in the Appendix (see Table 8). 
In terms of per capita levels, however, the differences between the two states are more pronounced (Table 
7 in the Appendix). Per capita administrative expenditures are about one third lower in Saxony. On the 
other hand, business development expenses per capita are three times lower in NRW.  
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TABLE 3 
AVERAGE SIZE OF MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE SUBCATEGORIES IN NRW AND SAXONY FOR YEARS 2009-2013 
Expenditure subcategory NRW Saxony 
Transport, infrastructure, and construction 
(TIC) expenditures 
13 % 13-14 % 
Administration expenditures 44-46 % 37-39 % 
Business development 1-2 % 3-6 % 
Public-facility expenditures 4-5 % 4 % 
Culture/ sports 4-5 % 7 % 
Health system 1 % 1 % 
Social services 23-26 % 23-27 % 
Education 6-7 % 6-7% 
Source: own calculations based on Genesis online 
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
4.1  Instrumental variables (estimation) 
To test for the existence of the flypaper effect we need to estimate the relationship between non-
matching transfers and public spending on the one hand and between non-matching transfers and 
municipally set tax rates on the other. Per capita total expenditures, expenditures in different 
subcategories, and the tax rates are dependent variables in the respective regressions. The key 
explanatory variable is always the value of the non-matching transfers (per capita). The flypaper effect 
exists if the value of the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant and positive in the 
expenditure regressions and non-negative in the tax-rate regressions (see Baskaran, 2016). 
For the estimations we employ a two-stage least squares method with instrumental variables, applied to 
a panel dataset. The motivation for this choice is the endogeneity problem known from previous 
literature. In particular, the size of the non-matching transfers may be non-random and related to 
unobserved attributes of the municipalities. Our identification strategy is based on utilizing the 
parameters used to determine the fiscal need of the municipalities (which was explained in Section 2). 
The instruments for transfers per capita are thus absolute population size and number of school students 
(per capita) because both are major factors for the calculation of a municipality’s fiscal need. Based on 
the underlying assumption there is no direct impact of the instruments on the per capita expenditures. It 
is plausible to assume that the absolute population size has no direct impact on the per capita 
expenditures. It is also reasonable to assume school students per capita not to have a direct impact on 
the expenditures per capita except on the education expenditures. For the regression of education 
expenses, we assume school students per capita not to be a valid instrument. Here we use the 
unemployment rate as an instrument instead (higher unemployment rate correlated with low fiscal 
capacity and thus higher transfers). 
Another way of accounting for unobserved characteristics of the municipalities would be to include 
municipal fixed effects in the regressions. One limitation of fixed-effects models is that the effects of 
variables with minor within-group variation or none at all cannot be reliably estimated. In addition, 
including fixed effects in the panel estimation with a small number of periods reduces efficiency 
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(Wooldridge, 2002). Comparing the within-variance of the relevant regressors with their between-
variance is an indicator for the power of the fixed effects model. The larger the within-variance, the 
better the performance of the fixed effects model will be (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). Table 9 in the 
Appendix indicates total, between, and within standard deviations for the key variables. We conclude 
that the within-variation of transfers and expenditures is rather small and hence do not include fixed 
effects in the estimation.7 
In the first stage, the transfer per capita variable is decomposed into a component explained by the 
instruments and a problematic component vit. The first stage is specified as follows:  
    𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝒂𝒂 ∙ 𝑿𝑿 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where                                                                       (1) 
TRit= non-matching transfers per capita of municipality i in year t; 
POPit= population size of municipality i in year t (used as an instrument); 
SSit= school students per capita of municipality i in year t (used as an instrument); 
X = vector of other explanatory variables.  
In the key estimates section we generate two specifications per federal state: reduced regressions and 
basic regressions. In the reduced regression, the only additional explanatory variables are the lagged 
dependent variables and the year dummies. The lagged dependent variable is used to capture the long-
term effects of transfers. Though a lagged dependent variable is normally endogenous, in this case it 
will not bias the estimation of the effect of transfers because their identification is based on exogenous 
instruments.  
The reduced regressions gives us first indications of the effect of transfers on expenditures. In the basic 
regression additional control variables are used to reduce bias and improve efficiency: age group shares 
of inhabitants below 20 years and above 65 years old, population density, and new debt per capita. Since 
certain expenditures in the municipalities may differ depending on the proportion of young, middle-
                                                     
7 For completeness, however, we include results for the pooled OLS estimation, a fixed effects regression, and 
single-year OLS regressions in Appendix Table 14. Results show no explanatory power of the instruments in the 
first stage. We thus rely thenceforward on pooled IV estimations, as Dahlberg et al. (2008) and Baskaran (2016) 
also do in most estimations.  
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aged, and old people, we control for the age composition of the population. Population density is 
designed to capture higher expenditures, notably in the larger towns. To test for possible fiscal 
restrictions influencing expenditures, we include the size of municipal loans/ debts as an additional 
control.  
Further fiscal and political factors may also influence municipality spending and are controlled for in 
the robustness section (see Section 5.2). 
In the second stage, the fitted values of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�  from the first stage are used instead of the problematic 
(endogenous) value of TR. The second stage is specified as follows:   
    𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝒃𝒃 ∙ 𝑿𝑿 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  where                                                                                           (2) 
yit= either expenditures per capita (total and subcategories) or business tax multiplier or property tax 
multiplier. 
We are mainly interested in the coefficients for transfers. From the estimations we hope to draw 
conclusions relating to flypaper effects and particularly to the expenditure subcategories in which this 
effect occurs in the two federal states. 
4.2 Data restrictions 
Before turning to the estimation itself, we report on some data problems. First, we had to get rid of a 
few outliers. Specifically, we dropped all municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (large cities 
according to the BBSR definition8), because most receive a disproportionate amount of transfers due to 
higher weighting factors when determining fiscal needs (see Figure 1). This applies to all estimations. 
In effect, four cities in NRW and two in Saxony were deleted from the sample.9  
In addition, the sample in the estimations varies due to missing values. They reduce the sample to the 
tune of some 380 data points per federal state (10% of the sample).  
                                                     
8 Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR): Laufende Stadtbeobachtung – Raumabgrenzungen, 
http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Raumbeobachtung/Raumabgrenzungen/StadtGemeindetyp/StadtGemeindet
yp_node.html. 
9 We varied this threshold to 100,000. The main results as discussed in the results section are confirmed. 
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FIGURE 1 
TRANSFERS PER CAPITA AGAINST POPULATION SIZE IN NRW AND SAXONY IN YEARS AVERAGE OF 2009-2013  
    
Note: Figures show per-capita transfers against population size. Source: own calculations. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Key estimates 
The results of the second-stage IV estimations for total expenditure and eight expenditure subcategories 
in the federal states NRW and Saxony for municipalities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants are 
presented in Table 4 and Table 5 below. Table 6 presents the IV estimations for the tax multipliers in 
NRW and Saxony.10 These tables do not include first-stage results. Extended first-stage results are 
reported in Table 10, 11, 12 of the Appendix. We report heteroscedasticity-robust and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors. 
We now analyze first stage results. As can be seen from the significance of the corresponding 
coefficients in the first stages (see Table 10, 11, 12), both instruments are strong predictors of transfers 
per capita. In addition, we report a number of diagnostics to check the validity of the IV estimates. A 
high F-statistic in the first stage is an indicator of a high correlation between the instruments and the 
endogenous variable (transfers). As a rule of thumb specified by Staiger and Stock (1997), F-values 
above 10 suggest strong instruments. This threshold is exceeded by all first-stage IV regressions. Thus, 
                                                     
10 The IV regression is estimated using the Stata package IVREG2 by Baum et al. (2010). 
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F-statistics in each of the IV regressions show joint statistical significance for the instruments in the first 
stage. 
We also report the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen test to show the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid and hence uncorrelated with the 
error term as well as correctly excluded (Baum et al., 2003). The Hansen’s J test statistics p-value 
indicates that in most IV estimations the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 % level. We 
therefore consider the instruments to be strong and valid. 
We now turn to the second stage results of the reduced regressions and the basic regressions. Table 4 
and Table 5 report a significant effect of transfers on total municipal expenditures both in NRW and in 
Saxony. The coefficients in both states are close to each other, which is a little surprising because even 
though the main features of the transfer allocation systems are similar, the states’ revenue structures and 
transfer dependencies are quite different, as we have seen. The coefficients in both cases are not 
significantly different from unity. These first results confirm the findings of Baskaran (2016) for Hesse 
(impact of transfers on total expenditures in the range of 70-90 cents). The coefficients of the other 
variables included are not relevant for the determination of the flypaper effect and thus not discussed 
here. 
In Table 6 we examine the effect of transfers on the two tax multipliers set by the municipalities. The 
estimations are again executed with lagged dependent variables and year dummies in all cases, as well 
as additional control variables as indicated. The second-stage estimates suggest a positive and 
statistically significant impact of transfers on the tax multipliers in both states. Thus tax multipliers do 
not decrease with higher transfers. Instead, some even increase slightly, at least the property tax 
multipliers. The coefficients are however very low. We conclude there is either no, or only a very small, 
positive effect of transfers on the tax multipliers.  
Our results point to a significant and strong effect of transfers on total spending. Furthermore, we find 
no negative effect of transfers on the tax rates, which means that taxes stay at the same level or even 
slightly increase. These findings indicate the existence of the flypaper effect in the municipalities of 
NRW and Saxony. 
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Next we investigate the effect of transfers on different expenditure subcategories. In NRW, the transfer 
coefficients for all subcategories are positive and significant at the 10 % level, except for administration 
and education expenditures. This is still the case after adding further covariates (see Table 4). The largest 
significant coefficients are found for social services and infrastructure expenditures, suggesting about 
10 to 20 cents spent for every extra euro from transfers.  
The estimates for Saxony are less stable (see also the robustness analysis). In the basic model, there are 
only four expenditure subcategories with positive and significant transfer coefficients (see Table 5). 
These subcategories are public facilities, culture/ sports, social services and education. The largest 
significant coefficients in the range of 10 to 20 cents are found for social services (as in NRW), 
culture/sports and education. Business development has a negative coefficient, it is however 
insignificant in the basic model.  
The most striking differences between the estimates for NRW and Saxony are (a) the insignificance of 
transfer coefficients for infrastructure and business development expenditures in Saxony, and (b) the 
insignificance of the transfer coefficient for education expenditures in NRW. As far as infrastructure 
and business development expenditures are concerned, the reason may be that Saxony, as noted in 
section 2, receives additional matching formula-based transfers for investment purposes plus substantial 
supplementary transfers for eastern federal states due to the former division. Thus, non-matching 
formula-based transfers affect these expenditure subcategories in Saxony to a lesser extent. NRW, by 
contrast, has to do without such targeted support for these types of municipal expenditure. This is, in 
fact, the background for the criticism of the solidarity pact voiced by the western federal states (Haseloff 
et al., 2015). 
Education is mostly financed at state level. Only local schools and minor research expenditures are 
financed at the municipal level. The significant effect of transfers on education expenditures in Saxony 
contrasts with the non-significant coefficient in NRW. There may be various reasons for this. First, 
unlike NRW, where schools are often also funded at a state or district level, Saxon municipalities are 
usually the maintainers of public schools. Second, and more importantly, the two states have different 
approaches to the consideration of the number of school students in the fiscal equalization formulas 
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from which transfers are calculated. NRW gives different weighting factors to full-time and part-time 
school students. In Saxony, school students are weighted according to the type of school they attend 
(primary school students are weighted higher than high school students, etc.) and multiplied by a factor 
that takes account of material and maintenance costs. Accordingly, formula-based transfers in Saxony 
are more strongly influenced by the number of students than formula-based transfers in NRW. This also 
has a more direct effect on education expenditures. 
Interestingly, the subcategory with the largest per capita expenses - administration - does not depend on 
transfers in either state. These findings are comparable with the results come up with by Weicher (1972), 
Grossman (1990), and Moiso (2002), whose analyses of the flypaper effect are partly category-specific. 
Formula-based transfers are thus used to increase spending on infrastructure, construction, culture, and 
sport rather than for administrative expenses. 
In general, examining the flypaper effect in different expenditure subcategories produces interesting 
results. In both states, municipalities spend a large share of lump-sum transfers to offset social service 
expenditures. NRW’s transfer use focuses on TIC expenditures, while Saxony uses them intensively for 
spending on culture/ sports and education. 
The next subsection is given over to robustness checks. 
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TABLE 4 
SECOND-STAGE IV REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EXPENDITURES IN NRW  
Dependent Variable:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Total Exp. TIC Admin. Pub. Facilities Bus. devel. Culture/Sport Health Social Serv. Education 
NRW (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Reduced model:          
Transfers per capita 
 
0.769*** 
(0.1659) 
0.102*** 
(0.032) 
0.084 
(0.0754) 
0.069*** 
(0.0154) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.081*** 
(0.0154) 
0.024*** 
(0.0079) 
0.228*** 
(0.0788) 
0.006 
(0.0055) 
N 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 
F 476.3 261.2 156.2 318.3 39.2 252.9 37 2040.2 372.3 
First-stage diagnostic          
Weak-Instruments Test (F-statistic) 55.7 56.7 59.7 50.7 57.8 76.5 56.3 19.4 233.3 
Over-Identification Test (Hansen J, p-value) 0.282 0.407 0.584 0.318 0.102 0.136 0.529 0.946 0.642 
          
          
Basic model:          
Transfers per capita 
 
0.657** 
(0.2594) 
0.165** 
(0.065) 
-0.121 
(0.1594) 
0.051*** 
(0.0193) 
0.0627** 
(0.027) 
0.093*** 
(0.0238) 
0.026*** 
(0.0083) 
0.152* 
(0.08) 
0.015 
(0.0111) 
N 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 
F 318.4 156.6 113.5 280.4 26.8 134 20.1 1558.4 200.7 
First-stage diagnostic          
Weak-Instruments Test (F-statistic) 22.7 17.3 16.6 17.2 18.4 26 61.3 12.3 190.7 
Over-Identification Test (Hansen J, p-value) 0.057 0.703 0.491 0.15 0.189 0.188 0.488 0.229 0.281 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 2SLS regressions—variables excluded from second stage: population size, school students per capita (unemployment per capita for education expenditures). 
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TABLE 5 
SECOND-STAGE IV REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EXPENDITURES IN SAXONY  
Dependent Variable:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Total Exp. TIC Admin. Pub. Facilities Bus devel. Culture/Sport Health Social Serv. Education 
Saxony (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Reduced model:          
Transfers per capita 
 
0.718**  
(0.2219) 
0.105*  
(0.0604) 
0.344**  
(0.129) 
0.043**  
(0.0213) 
-0.127**  
(0.056) 
0.178***  
(0.0398) 
0.00001  
(0.0168) 
0.049  
(0.0423) 
0.204***  
(0.0492) 
N 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1700 
F 168.1 81.6 68.27 46.99 66.98 88.85 11.72 112.65 54.04 
First-stage diagnostic          
Weak-Instruments Test (F-statistic) 154.5 134.1 139.8 137.6 133.96 144.34 137.6 175.34 144.7 
Over-Identification Test (Hansen J, p-value) 0.765 0.62 0.52 0.142 0.117 0.058 0.208 0.087 0.753 
          
          
Basic model:          
Transfers per capita 
 
0.772*** 
(0.2782) 
0.026 
(0.0717) 
0.19 
(0.172) 
0.081*** 
(0.0251) 
-0.066 
(0.0671) 
0.137*** 
(0.0418) 
0.007 
(0.0229) 
0.127** 
(0.0571) 
0.198*** 
(0.0554) 
N 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1628 
F 93.27 50.37 44.5 29.75 44.58 79.16 5.94 97.1 36.04 
First-stage diagnostic          
Weak-Instruments Test (F-statistic) 92.4 80.6 78.9 109.1 82.36 88.69 84.29 100.21 120.5 
Over-Identification Test (Hansen J, p-value) 0.674 0.404 0.285 0.148 0.04 0.07 0.092 0.115 0.395 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 2SLS regressions—variables excluded from second stage: population size, school students per capita (unemployment per capita for education expenditures). 
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TABLE 6 
SECOND-STAGE IV REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TAX MULTIPLIERS IN NRW AND SAXONY 
 NRW Saxony 
Model: Reduced Basic Reduced Basic 
Dependent Variable:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Property Tax Business Tax Property Tax Business Tax Property Tax Business Tax Property Tax Business Tax
 (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Transfers per capita 
 
0.049*** 
(0.0186) 
0.014*** 
(0.0053) 
0.044 
(0.0294) 
0.011 
(0.0102) 
0.029*** 
(0.0107) 
0.004 
(0.00292) 
0.037*** 
(0.0137) 
0.0003 
(0.0037) 
Control Variables No  No Yes Yes No  No    Yes Yes 
N 1568 1568 1503 1503 1712 1712 1631 1631 
F 554.6 2069.8 289.2 1253.1 1326.5 1680.4 821 946.3 
First stage diagnostic         
Weak-Instruments Test (F-statistic) 22.8 34.5 11.1 17 111.7 110 74.5 74.7 
Over-Identification Test (Hansen J, p-value) 0.474 0.264 0.289 0.895 0.055  0.364 0.045 0.269 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 2SLS regressions—variables excluded from second stage: population size, school students per capita (unemployment per capita for education expenditures). 
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5.2 Robustness checks 
In this section we perform a number of robustness checks to explore whether the core results are stable. We 
build on the basic model and add further control variables or vary the sample.  
First, we include other revenue variables in the regression, such as accumulated tax revenues and other 
transfers (transfers for present purposes and investment transfers), because they may also have an impact 
on expenditure in the municipalities. To a large extent, tax revenue can explain spending. Other transfers 
are bound to a specific spending purpose (matching transfers) and may be granted to redress the balance in 
favor of municipalities with low formula-based transfers. These variables are not exogenous because to 
some extent at least they are connected to the determination of the formula-based transfers. 
Multicollinearity problems, however, should not be an issue due to the low correlation of these additional 
regressors to the formula-based transfers. 
The results of the estimation are given in the “All Tax” column of Table 13 in the Appendix. First of all, 
the basic estimations are confirmed in their predictions. There is a significant and positive effect of the 
transfers on total spending and several expenditure subcategories and either no effect or even a slightly 
positive effect of transfers on the tax multipliers. As in the basic estimations, total expenditure coefficients 
are not significantly different from 1. In NRW those effects are found in the same expenditure subcategories 
as in the basic estimations. In Saxony, the social services category is no longer significant, all other 
subcategories are roughly on the same level. As we have noted, the estimates of the additional variables 
included are probably biased because taxes and transfers are not fully exogenous.  
As a second check, we remove the abundant municipalities (municipalities with a high tax capacity that 
receive low transfers) because they could potentially distort the basic results. In NRW, 60 municipalities 
are abundant and thus dropped out of the estimation, in Saxony there are 23 such municipalities.  
The estimations are presented in the “Not Abundant” column of Table 13. As is to be expected, the 
expenditure coefficients in both states become larger, although this increase is not statistically significant. 
This suggests that an increase in transfers per capita by 1 euro increases expenditures per capita by around 
1 euro. 
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Thirdly, we add political variables: (1) the number of council seats per capita, and (2) a CDU-dummy 
indicating whether the Christian Democratic Party is part of the government. Due to data availability, this 
test is conducted for Saxony only. These variables are potentially endogenous (if a certain party or a certain 
size of council influences fiscal capacity, etc.), but they may also be related to spending behavior as a result 
of different political attitudes. Council size has a potential impact on expenses; council seats per capita in 
a parliament are related to the political influence of the residents in the municipality. The purpose of the 
CDU-dummy is to find out whether the party governing a municipality is important. It is conceivable that 
CDU-governed municipalities may have been given special treatment because both at state and federal level 
the CDU was the governing party for the entire sample period (in a coalition with the market-liberal FDP). 
Accordingly, it is possible that central-level governments may have preferences for the specific political 
characteristics of municipalities and that this will affect their spending behavior.11  
The estimations for Saxony are presented in the “CDU+Seats” column of Table 13. The coefficient of the 
effect of transfers on the total expenditures is larger than in the basic model, but again the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
As a fourth robustness check of the basic estimations, we pool our samples for NRW and Saxony to analyze 
whether the former discrete flypaper effect still exists in the pooled constellation. The pooled sample 
estimates are reported in the column “Pooled” in Table 13. They are very similar to the basic estimations, 
though slightly larger. The effect of transfers on administration expenditures is the only coefficient that is 
not significant. Overall, this pooled estimation confirms the earlier separate estimations.  
In all four robustness checks in this section, the main thrust of the results of the basic model is confirmed. 
We thus interpret the basic estimations of the flypaper effect as robust. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In line with many investigations in the empirical literature, we find robust evidence for the existence of a 
flypaper effect in the expenditures of the municipalities in the German federal states NRW and Saxony. In 
both these states, we find that higher formula-based transfers increase local expenditures but do not reduce 
                                                     
11 Also described in Dahlberg et al. (2008). 
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taxes. Possible endogeneity problems are handled by applying the instrumental variables method, where 
indicators operative in the determination of fiscal needs and thus influential on the level of formula-based 
transfers are used as instruments. The instrumental variables employed are reported to be valid and relevant. 
The fact that the independent results point in a similar direction for both states indicates that the evidence 
for the existence of the flypaper effect is not confined to these two states alone and could potentially be 
generalized to most other German federal states. 
As Inman (2008) puts it, “once viewed as anomaly, the flypaper effect should now be seen as a reality of 
fiscal politics”. Studying the way transfers are spent then gives useful information about citizen preferences 
for local public goods (ibid.).  
In this regard, our basic model results show that there are two important similarities between the spending 
behavior of the municipalities in NRW and Saxony. First, in both cases we cannot identify a significant 
impact of transfers on general administrative expenditures. That may be a positive finding, suggesting that 
the municipalities do not use the lump-sum transfers just in order to increase the administrative staff. 
Second, the coefficients for several expenditure subcategories, such as public facilities, culture/sports, and 
social services are very close in the two federal states. That could be a sign either of similar public 
preferences or of similar spending priorities of the municipalities (municipal duties), despite large 
differences in overall transfer dependency.  
A substantial difference in the estimates for the education expenditures in the two federal states could be 
due to important differences in the structure of schools and in the weighting of school students as discussed 
above. More important, from our point of view, are differences regarding the infrastructure and business 
development expenditures. The estimates suggest that lump-sum transfers have an impact on these two 
expenditure categories in NRW, but not in Saxony. Without further research, it is not possible to definitely 
connect this result to differences in public preferences or other factors. Still, it is important to note that 
eastern federal states receive targeted support for these types of expenditures under the framework of the 
solidarity pact. This could be a reason why the lump-sum transfers are not used to fund such expenditures 
in Saxony.  
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Appendix 
TABLE 7 - SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  NRW   Saxony 
          Obs Weighted 
mean 
Mean Std Dev Min Max    Obs Weighted 
mean 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Expenditures              
Total expenditure p.c. 1980 2527.9 1971.4 485.9 1056.5 4925.2  2150 2036.1 1624.8 539.3 700.4 8834.5 
TIC p.c. 1980 329.1 276.9 131.7 0.3 1085.7  2150 279.7 239.4 158.4 18.2 2215.9 
Administration p.c. 1980 1143.6 1104.5 272.2 515.9 3703.2  2150 771.2 723.4 312.8 168.1 4331.6 
Business development p.c. 1980 38.1 30.1 42.5 0 487.7  2150 108.8 128.9 214.6 0 6737 
Public facility p.c. 1980 101.8 69.1 43.1 3.9 330.4  2150 81.9 67.7 64.4 4.5 1022 
Culture/ Sports p.c. 1980 107.5 63.4 43.9 0 356.5  2150 143.8 65.2 75 0 912.6 
Health p.c. 1980 19.3 12.9 8.9 0 262.5  2150 21.1 6.8 36.7 0 990.5 
Social services p.c. 1980 622.3 263.6 257.8 8 1819.8  2150 495.6 299 112.0 0 1453.6 
Education p.c. 1980 166.2 151.1 70.1 13.6 569.4  2150 133.7 94.3 113.5 0 2300.5 
Revenues              
Formula-based Transfers 
p.c. 
1980 298.3 194.8 161.6 -38.7 930.7  2150 384.4 222.6 92.5 2.8 723.4 
All tax revenue p.c. 1980 1061.2 931 323.5 308.3 6355.8  2136 615.6 489.7 240.3 90.1 3645.5 
All non-tax revenue p.c. 1980 1469.3 1038.7 416.8 283.5 3707.8  2150 1434.6 1134.4 433.9 202.8 6359.6 
Tax multipliers              
Property tax multiplier, % 1980  419.2 56.7 240 825  2150  397.9 35.6 300 650 
Business tax multiplier, % 1980  424.1 26.3 300 520  2150  385.9 19.8 275 490 
Other Indicators              
Debt level p.c. 1906 2297.8 1496.9 1245.9 0 8580  2078 739.6 631.4 465.5 0.00 3756 
New debts p.c. 1899 60.3 82.38 208.89 -1559.65 2190.24  2057 -11.8 -5.85 125.04 -1434 1847 
% Age 0-20 1980  0.2 0.02 0.16 0.28  2136  0.15 0.02 0.06 0.22 
% Age 20-65 1980  0.59 0.02 0.52 0.66  2136  0.60 0.03 0.51 0.70 
% Age 65+ 1980  0.20 0.02 0.12 0.31  2136  0.24 0.03 0.15 0.34 
Population 1980  45086 87617 4089 1036253  2136  9396 37919 355 531562 
Population density 1980  504.3 532.8 43 3221  2150  193.9 222.3 0.00 1784 
School students p.c. 1980  0.12 0.04 0.03 0.26  2150  0.06 0.04 0 0.28 
Unemployment rate p.c. 1980  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07  2133  0.05 0.02 0.01 0.15 
Notes: Statistics for pooled observations 2009-2013. Monetary values in euro, prices of 2010.
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TABLE 8 
THE EXPENDITURE SUBCATEGORIES IN NRW AND SAXONY 
Expenditure 
subcategory  
NRW Saxony 
Transport, 
infrastructure, 
construction 
(TIC) 
Spatial planning and development, 
geo-information, construction and 
property regulation, housing- 
construction funding, electricity, gas, 
water, district heat supply, waste 
management, sewage disposal, 
municipal-roads, district-roads, state-
roads, federal-roads, road cleaning, 
parking facilities, public transport, 
other passenger and goods transport, 
ports 
Spatial planning and measurement, 
construction regulation and 
administration, housing-construction 
funding, housing-care, housing-
enterprises, municipal-roads, district-
roads, state-roads, federal roads, road 
cleaning and lighting, provisions for 
stationary traffic, water supply and 
flow  
Administration Administration management and 
service, statistics and elections, 
regulatory affairs, funeral and cemetery 
services, taxes, general transfers and 
general levies, general financial 
economy 
Administration management and 
service, municipal authorities, 
auditing, general financial economy, 
special offices of the general 
administration, administration 
provision, police, public order, 
defense burden sharing, funeral 
services, taxes, general transfers and 
general levies, handling of recent 
years 
Business 
development 
General institutions and companies, 
business development, tourism 
Markets, slaughter houses, 
stockyards, auxiliary systems of the 
administration, tourism, other 
receivables for economy and 
transportation, management of 
commercial enterprises, utility 
companies, transport companies, 
business development companies, 
agriculture and forestry companies, 
other business companies, general 
property, special property 
Public facilities Fire protection, emergency services, 
large-scale emergencies, disaster 
control, public green areas, nature and 
rural conservation, agriculture and 
forestry, environmental measures, 
immission protection, landscaping, 
public waters, water supply plants, 
monument conservation and care 
Fire protection, disaster control, 
nature conservation, public green 
areas, monument conservation and 
care, other public institutions, 
agriculture and forestry 
Culture/ Sport Museums, exhibitions, zoological and 
botanical gardens, theater, public music 
culture, music schools, adult education 
center, libraries, other adult education, 
cultural education, national education, 
clerical affairs 
Management of cultural affairs, 
museums, exhibitions, preservation 
of the cultural heritage, cultural 
education, national education, 
clerical affairs, funding of sports, 
sports facilities, bathing 
establishments 
Health Health administration, hospitals, health 
care, recreational facility, spas and bath 
houses   
Health administration, hospitals, 
health care, recreational facilities, 
spas and bath houses   
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Social services Primary care, basic social benefits,  
benefits for asylum seekers, social 
facilities, war victim welfare, benefits 
under the Federal Pensions Act, 
benefits for severely disabled persons, 
funding of welfare carriers, benefits for 
living, inclusion of disabled persons, 
help with care, advances  on 
maintenance payments, assistance 
services, funding for returnees and 
political prisoners, other social 
services, funding for children, youth 
work, services for young people and 
families   
Administration of social affairs, 
social welfare according to law, Act 
on Benefits for Asylum Seekers, 
social facilities, war victim welfare, 
facilities of the youth welfare system, 
funding of welfare carriers, other 
social services, social affairs 
Education Primary schools, secondary schools, 
combined primary and secondary 
schools, high schools, comprehensive 
schools, vocational schools, special 
schools, other formal school tasks, 
science and research 
School administration, primary 
schools, secondary schools, high 
schools, vocational schools, general 
special schools, comprehensive 
schools, other formal school tasks, 
science and research 
Source: Genesis online.  
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TABLE 9 
BETWEEN- AND WITHIN-VARIATION OF KEY VARIABLES 
   NRW Saxony 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Transfers p.c. overall 194.84 161.58 N = 1980 222.64 106.64 N = 2150 
 between  149.52 n = 396  98.48 n = 430 
 within  61.61 T = 5  41.14 T = 5 
         
Expenditures p.c. overall 1971.42 485.89 N = 1980 1624.78 539.33 N = 2150 
 between  455.3 n = 396  441.52 n = 430 
 within  170.9 T = 5  310.32 T = 5 
         
Property tax multiplier overall 419.24 56.69 N = 1980 397.95 35.58 N = 2150 
 between  45.09 n = 396  33.75 n = 430 
 within  34.41 T = 5  11.36 T = 5 
         
Business tax multiplier overall 424.13 26.32 N = 1980 385.91 19.79 N = 2150 
 between  24.22 n = 396  18.85 n = 430 
 within  10.38 T = 5  6.07 T = 5 
         
Population share under 
20 overall 
 .20 .019 N = 1980 .15 .02 N = 2136 
 between  .02 n = 396  .02 n = 430 
 within  .005 T = 5  .01 T = 4.97 
         
Population share over 65 overall .20 .02 N = 1980 .24 .04 N = 2136 
 between  .02 n = 396  .03 n = 430 
 within  .003 T = 5  .01 T = 4.97 
         
Population density overall 504.26 532.76 N = 1980 195.79 222 N = 2150 
 between  532.73 n = 396  222.1 n = 430 
 within  24.62 T = 5  7.36 T = 5 
         
New debts p.c. overall 82.38 208.9 N = 1899 -5.85 125.04 N = 2057 
 between  121.23 n = 386  49.57 n = 420 
 within  169.9 T = 4.92  114.9 T = 4.9 
         
All tax revenue p.c. overall 931.03 323.5 N = 1980 489.7 240.3 N = 2150 
 between  278.6 n = 396  214.46 n = 430 
 within  164.9 T = 5  108.8 T = 5 
         
All non-tax revenue p.c. overall 1038.67 416.82 N = 1980 1134.42 433.86 N = 2150 
 between  382.3 n = 396  331.36 n = 430 
 within  166.97 T = 5  280.43 T = 5 
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TABLE 10 
FIRST-STAGE RESULTS OF THE KEY ESTIMATIONS FOR NRW (2009-2013) 
First-stage results:    Total Exp. TIC Admin. Pub. Facilities Bus. devel. Culture/Sport Health Social Serv. Education 
Dependent Variable:   Transfers per capita                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Reduced model: (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NRW          
Population size 
 
School students pc 
 
Unemployment rate pc 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
166.4* 
(88.6) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
192.9** 
(88.9) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
183.2** 
(87.7) 
 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
182.5** 
(88.3) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
183** 
(88.1) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
194.3** 
(88.5) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
186.2** 
(87) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
85.7 
(89.1) 
 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
6972.8*** 
(366.9) 
N 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 
F 498.8 254.7 144.1 384.2 31.96 302.9 51.82 2303.9 294.2 
          
          
Basic model:          
Population size 
 
School students pc 
 
Unemployment rate pc  
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
158.6* 
(92) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
139.5 
(91.9) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
143.8* 
(90) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
133.3 
(91.6) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
133.2 
(91.7) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
164.8* 
(93) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
178.2* 
(92.2) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
62.9 
(92.1) 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
8246.6*** 
(399.4) 
N 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503 
F 317.5 164.3 96.20 307.8 25.07 
 
167.2 28.90 1622.2 179.3 
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TABLE 11 
FIRST-STAGE RESULTS OF THE KEY ESTIMATIONS FOR SAXONY (2009-2013)  
 
First stage results:   Total Exp. TIC Admin. Pub. Facilities Bus. devel. Culture/Sport Health Social Serv. Education 
Dependent Variable:  Transfers per capita                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Reduced model: (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Saxony          
Population size 
 
School students pc 
 
Unemployment rate pc  
0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
750.6*** 
(52.1)  
0.0023*** 
(0.0002) 
691.1*** 
(52.8) 
0.0024*** 
(0.0002) 
733.9*** 
(51.7) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
658.7*** 
(53.1) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
658.8*** 
(53.3) 
0.0024*** 
(0.0002) 
709.2*** 
(53.3) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
665.5*** 
(53.5) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
617.5*** 
(53.7) 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
1740.3*** 
(151.8) 
N 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1700 
F 143.8 81.89 68.98 42.74 73.38 120.6 13.09 111.3 59.14 
          
Basic model:          
Population size 
 
School students pc 
 
Unemployment rate pc  
 0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
641.7*** 
(57.7) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
574.6*** 
(58.2) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
612.9*** 
(57.6) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0002) 
558.7*** 
(58.9) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
554.4*** 
(59) 
0.0024*** 
(0.0002) 
595.2*** 
(58.7) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
665.5*** 
(53.5) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0002) 
558.4*** 
(58.8) 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
1768.3*** 
(154.3) 
N 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1628 
F 78.81 48.38 39.76 32.34 47.65 90.90 7.386 89.37 35.36 
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TABLE 12 
FIRST-STAGE RESULTS OF TAXES IN THE KEY ESTIMATIONS IN NRW AND SAXONY (2009-2013) 
 NRW  Saxony 
First stage results:   Property 
Tax 
Business 
Tax 
  Property 
Tax 
Business 
Tax 
   Property 
Tax 
Business  
Tax 
  Property  
Tax 
Business 
Tax 
Dependent Variable:    Transfers per capita                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 (1) (2)    (3)        (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Population size 
 
School students pc 
 
Unemployment rate pc  
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
199.4** 
(86.5) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
174.7** 
(87.2) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
128 
(90.7) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
93.1 
(91) 
 0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
653*** 
(53.5) 
0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
638.1*** 
(53.4) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0001) 
565.8*** 
(58.8) 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
547.8*** 
(58.4) 
Lagged dependent variable Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Control variables No  No Yes Yes  No  No    Yes Yes 
N 1568 1568 1503 1503  1712 1712 1631 1631 
F 557.5 2086.6 290.1 1117.7  1289.5 1941.4 813.2 1053.7 
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TABLE 13 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS (SECOND-STAGE RESULTS) 
Dependent Variable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Basic estimation “All Tax” “Not Abundant” “CDU+Seats” “Pooled”
 NRW  Saxony NRW  Saxony NRW  Saxony Saxony NRW & Saxony 
Total Expenditure 
 
0.657** 
(0.2594) 
0.772*** 
(0.2782) 
1.185*** 
(0.288) 
0.589*** 
(0.222) 
1.282*** 
(0.460) 
1.117*** 
(0.312) 
0.991*** 
(0.33) 
1.125*** 
(0.258) 
Wald Test (p-value) 
H0= coefficient not signif. 
different from 1 
0.186 0.412 0.52 0.065 0.54 0.708 0.977 0.627 
TIC  
 
0.165** 
(0.065) 
0.026 
(0.0717) 
0.134** 
(0.061) 
-0.033 
(0.068) 
0.225** 
(0.096) 
0.045 
(0.082) 
0.085 
(0.085) 
0.227*** 
(0.059) 
Administration -0.12  
(0.1594) 
0.19 
(0.172) 
-0.237 
(0.184) 
-0.106 
(0.154) 
-0.053 
(0.223) 
0.127 
(0.163) 
0.154 
(0.179) 
-0.097 
(0.084) 
Public facilities 0.051*** 
(0.0193) 
0.081*** 
(0.0251) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
0.086*** 
(0.023) 
  0.063** 
(0.027) 
0.115*** 
(0.036) 
0.124*** 
(0.041) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
Business development 0.0627** 
(0.027) 
-0.066 
(0.0671) 
0.059** 
(0.029) 
-0.145 
(0.110) 
0.097** 
(0.041) 
-0.018 
(0.06) 
0.041 
(0.067) 
0.062** 
(0.028) 
Culture/Sport 0.093*** 
(0.0238) 
0.137*** 
(0.0418) 
0.115*** 
(0.025) 
0.119** 
(0.046) 
0.143*** 
(0.038) 
0.162*** 
(0.041) 
0.175*** 
(0.05) 
0.137*** 
(0.033) 
Health 
 
0.026*** 
(0.0083) 
0.007 
(0.0229) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
0.045 
(0.042) 
0.05*** 
(0.015) 
Social Services 0.152* 
(0.08) 
0.127** 
(0.0571) 
0.239*** 
(0.09) 
0.092 
(0.056) 
0.138 
(0.107) 
0.138** 
(0.069) 
0.144** 
(0.068) 
0.22*** 
(0.071) 
Education 
 
0.015 
(0.0111) 
0.198*** 
(0.0554) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.167*** 
(0.056) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
0.236*** 
(0.067) 
0.146** 
(0.062) 
0.065** 
(0.026) 
Property Tax 0.044 
(0.0294) 
0.037*** 
(0.0137) 
0.043 
(0.03) 
0.034*** 
(0.016) 
0.03 
(0.039) 
0.037*** 
(0.017) 
0.041** 
(0.019) 
0.061*** 
(0.022) 
Business Tax 0.011 
(0.0102) 
0.0003 
(0.0037) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2SLS regressions—variables excluded from second stage are the following: population size, school students per capita (unemployment per capita for education expenditures). 
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TABLE 14 
POOLED OLS AND FIXED EFFECTS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS 
Dependent Variable:    Total Expenditure                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Pooled OLS Fixed Effects OLS 2013 OLS 2012 OLS 2011 OLS 2010 
 (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) 
NRW       
Transfers per capita 
 
0.768*** 
(0.161) 
1.866 
(3.077) 
0.737** 
(0.291) 
0.579*** 
(0.326) 
0.962*** 
(0.364) 
0.775*** 
(0.278) 
N 1568 1568 392 392 392 392 
F 498.8 5.5 401.8  369.9 394.4 261.8 
       
Saxony       
Transfers per capita 
 
0.718*** 
(0.236) 
-2.53 
(2.38) 
1.16** 
(0.333) 
0.471 
(0.422) 
-0.024 
(0.638) 
0.661*** 
(0.241) 
N 1712 1712 428 428 428 428 
F 143.8 33.5 46.1 88.2 61.4 158.7 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 2SLS regressions—variables excluded from second stage are the following: population size, school students per capita (unemployment per capita for education expenditures). 
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FIGURE 2 
PER CAPITA LEVELS OF TOTAL TRANSFERS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF NRW AND SAXONY (2013) – IN 
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES 
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FIGURE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE COMPONENTS (2013) 
  
Note:  Figures show kernel density estimations for total tax revenues per capita and total transfers per capita in 
the municipalities of Saxony and NRW. Source: own calculation. 
